Expertise leads to overreach. Some who have it think it qualifies them to hold opinions about other fields in which they have none.

There was Dr. Robert Shockley, co-inventor of the transistor, who thought his opinion about the relationship between IQ and race was worth listening to, entertainers who think their celebrity makes their opinions about foreign policy worthy of our time and attention, and, (this week’s topic) economists, too many of whom consider their thoughts about business management to be worth sharing.

The problem in four steps:

  1. Economists study the behavior of markets.
  2. To understand markets, economists make a simplifying assumption — that humans act to “maximize utility” — to optimize transactions for personal gain.
  3. Most economists, most of the time, use money as a proxy for utility (the economists’ term for “what people value”).
  4. They then force-fit a marketplace perspective onto every phenomenon in human interactions in order to prescribe how we all ought to go about our lives.

Step four is where the trouble starts. Here’s a non-business example: Most of us value friendship. And yet, creating a “friendship marketplace” doesn’t work — renting another person’s time and attention doesn’t make them your friend. (For more on this and related topics, read Michael Sandel’s “How Markets Crowd Out Morals,” Boston Review, May/June edition, and thanks to long-time correspondent Leo Heska for bringing it to our attention.)

When it comes to business …

Economic theory started to encroach on what we laughingly call “management science” during the Japanese invasion of the mid-1970s. That’s when Toyotas and Datsuns turned out to cost less and hold up better than anything GM,  Ford and Chrysler were selling, and buying televisions from Sony and Panasonic provided better value than RCA or Zenith.

Prior to that, business leaders understood that paychecks were what they exchanged for an employee’s effort — “An honest day’s work for an honest day’s pay” — but that they received an employee’s loyalty in exchange for a different coinage.

And so, employers redefined the employer/employee relationship as nothing more than a marketplace, and employee loyalty became a quaint hold-over of a simpler time. It wasn’t that employers didn’t want employee loyalty after that. It’s that they became blind to the coinage needed to get it, namely, their own loyalty toward their employees.

Who but an economist … someone who considers a giving a gift to be a less-efficient alternative to handing over an appropriately calculated wad of cash … could make a mistake like that?

It was at about the same time that boards of directors decided they had to bribe their CEOs to do their jobs, at an ever-increasing level of bribery (you’ll find charts and graphs in “Historical Trends in Executive Compensation, 1936-2005,” Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks, January 18, 2007).

Is it actually bribery? That depends on your perspective.

Mine is that there really is an employment marketplace, which means that to fill any position, a company has to be willing to pay what the market will bear … or, must offer enough intangible benefits to compensate for the money they aren’t able to offer, remembering that money isn’t utility, it’s a proxy for utility.

Compensation is what companies provide in order to get the right people to work there instead of somewhere else. Using it to change someone’s behavior? That’s a bribe (“Something, such as money or a favor, offered or given to a person in a position of trust to influence that person’s views or conduct,” from The Free Dictionary).

Unless you’re an economist, in which case money is the sole driver of human behavior.

Then there’s the asset view of the enterprise. Prior to the takeover of management by economists, business managers figured they were responsible for running a successful business — one that out-competed other companies that sold similar goods and services.

But no longer. For the most part, business management now tries to maximize “shareholder value,” for which market capitalization is an appropriate metric. Business management became responsible for what a company can be sold for, not for what it does.

This would be just fine were it not for a nice little irony: The path to maximizing a company’s asset value is to ignore it.

The companies that are worth the most aren’t the ones that try to move the price of a share of stock in the right direction. They’re the ones where everyone focuses on selling great products and taking care of customers. That’s everyone. Including the IT staff.

Which means that as an IT leader, part of your job is helping everyone in IT connect the dots that separate their jobs from the company’s products and customers.

Not “internal customers.” The company’s customers.

And now, three words about retention bonuses: Are you serious?

Take the badly misnamed Best Buy (or, as a friend calls it, “Amazon’s showroom”), whose board of directors has awarded big piles of cash and restricted stock to its CFO, EVP/HR, President/International, and President/U.S. to encourage them to stay with the company instead of jumping ship to join Best Buy’s founder, Dick Schulze, as he attempts to take over the company.

Understand, I’m jealous. Can you blame me? Nobody has paid me anything remotely like this for screwing things up badly and repeatedly. Heck, nobody has paid me anything like this for doing a good job.

I should probably leave the EVP/HR out of this. She’s hardly responsible for Best Buy’s failure to provide the best buy … or anything remotely close to it … and its consequent ever-increasing decline in marketplace relevance, especially as she’s only had a couple of years to do any damage. But then, what impact is she likely to have on Best Buy’s future competitiveness that makes her worth a retention bonus like this?

But, the presidents of U.S. and international operations have their names all over Best Buy’s failures. And its CFO, who joined Best Buy in 2003, has been in his current role since before the start of the Great Recession. If the CFO position is important enough that a retention bonus is in order, that means its occupant has been involved in the planning and decision-making that has led to Best Buy’s steady decline.

All of which leads to two questions. The first: Is it a good idea to bribe top executives to stay? And second: If you’re going to bribe some top executives to stay, should they be the ones whose names are all over past failures or who won’t have a significant impact on future success?

The second question is, of course, rhetorical. The first is worth serious thought.

That the sums in question are bribes is by definition. Best Buy is paying a lot of money specifically to get these people to do something they wouldn’t otherwise do — to stay with the captain of a sinking ship instead of joining the band of mutineers (pick a different metaphor if you don’t like this one).

So the question is, should a board of directors want top executives who will only stay if they’re bribed to do so?

Regular KJR readers know my position on this: No (see “Is it time to end incentive pay?KJR, 4/23/2012). Any executive who doesn’t consider their opportunity to achieve something important to be an incredible privilege is an executive you’re better off encouraging a competitor to hire.

As for Dick Schulze’s attempt to take over the company, here’s a question for anyone considering an alliance with him: Why would you do that? He’s the guy who, when he had the chance to crush Amazon.com when it first expanded into consumer electronics and, oh, by the way, to crush Circuit City as an afterthought, instead chose to view Circuit City as the competitor that mattered?

Taking shots at Best Buy is easy and fun. Behind the fun is a question you might find yourself having to deal with in this era of frequent mergers and acquisitions: Whether to offer retention bonuses of your own.

That answer is, yes. There are times when retention bonuses make all kinds of sense, for example, when a company has been acquired, key positions are being consolidated, and you need the services of the good employees who hold those positions in the meantime, to ensure a smooth transition.

That’s assuming, of course, that while these employees are good enough to help with the transition, they aren’t good enough … or a good enough fit … to be worth finding a role for in the consolidated enterprise once the business integration process is complete.

So if you have employees like this — ones who will be essential to a smooth transition but who aren’t worth investing in as long-term highly desirable employees — you only have two ways to keep them on board — either bribe them, or lie.

Unless you lie, they’ll know that when the deal is done they’ll be out of a job. They’ll have no reason to do more than the minimum for you while finding a new place of employment that offers more stability.

If you need them and don’t want to lie, it’s the only solution that will work. Make the amount big enough to work, and no bigger.

Just don’t pretend that you’re doing anything fancy.

You’re offering a bribe.