Should executives receive incentive pay? Should anyone?

Last week’s KJR explored the logic behind incentive pay, and concluded it doesn’t hold up to scrutiny (I nearly said “close scrutiny,” which contrasts with the distant scrutiny that’s so popular these days).

Incentive pay shares a characteristic with at least four other well-established business practices — recruiting, performance appraisals, outsourcing, and software development — namely, the widespread certainty that when they don’t work, the problem is with the details of execution, not the fundamental concept:

Recruiting: As my friend Nick Corcodilos of Ask The Headhunter fame has been pointing out for years, the industry-standard recruiting practice of posting a position description, screening resumes based on skill-to-task matching, and so on fills fewer than one out of every ten open positions. And yet, most companies continue to pretend it works, even though, based on the numbers, it’s obviously broken.

Performance appraisals: Okay, I don’t have any documented numbers to back this opinion. Based on what I’ve seen, over the past few decades the performance appraisal process (really, practice) has become increasingly bulky and time-consuming for both managers and those they manage.

The payoff for the additional time and energy diverted to this activity? So far as I can tell, managers hate it, few employees find it valuable, and there’s no evidence that better employee performance correlates with more extensive and intensive performance appraisals.

Outsourcing: As documented in Outsourcing debunked (me, 2011), the only constant in the outsourcing industry is its failure rate. Commonly, three years into most outsourcing deals the contracting company finds itself either renegotiating their contract or terminating it altogether. Overall the numbers seem to show that between 30% and 70% of all outsources fail, depending on whose numbers you’re reading and the type of outsource they’re writing about.

But the numbers you read almost certainly underestimate the failure rate. Here in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metro, for example, it’s widely known that Best Buy is quietly unwinding its high-profile outsource to Accenture, but nobody in either Best Buy or Accenture publicly admits the whole venture was a failure.

Software development: For at least two decades, waterfall development wasn’t a way to develop software. It was the way, even though the way that preceded it (or at least one of the ways) — frequent informal conversations between business managers and programmers, with programmers showing business managers their results as soon as there was something to show and the business managers providing feedback that led to quick course-corrections — demonstrably worked.

I say demonstrably because the near-universal pre-waterfall outcome was stable, tailored-to-the-business, feature-rich applications, unlike waterfall, with its notorious 70% across-the-board failure rate.

Isn’t it interesting that when you read the Agile Manifesto, it sounds a whole lot like nostalgia for the pre-waterfall days?

At least with software development, as an industry we finally acknowledged that waterfall doesn’t work, although we needed a couple of decades dominated by dismal failure to accept this.

Too bad the Agile Manifesto hasn’t kept up with the times. It’s about software delivery to customers at a time when (1) there are no internal customers, and (2) the point isn’t software delivery, it’s successful, designed, planned business change.

Incentive pay, recruiting, performance appraisals, outsourcing, and software development. Five very different concepts. In all five cases, the business community has spent decades assuming the problem was with execution, not in fundamentally flawed concepts.

Here’s the irony: If an assumption was to be made, flawed execution was the right one. It’s the Edison Ratio in action.

Edison, you’ll recall, explained genius as being one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration. Given this 99:1 ratio, logic dictates that when something goes wrong, it’s 99 times more likely to have been with the sweat than with the idea … with the execution, not the concept.

So the issue isn’t that business leaders, faced with failures, focused their attention on execution. Quite the opposite, this was admirable. It means they recognized that there’s no substitute for sweating the details.

No, the issue is how long it should take to figure out that the problem is the core concept after all.

In this, business leaders would do well to accept the advice of the source of so much wisdom, W.C. Fields: “If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again. Then give up. There’s no use in being a damn fool about it.”

CitiGroup’s shareholders, in the non-binding vote made possible by Dodd-Frank, have sent a message to the Board of Directors: Don’t be ridiculous.

In case you somehow managed to miss this story, CitiGroup’s shareholders were given a chance to vote retrospectively (and can I just ask, WHAT???) on whether they approved of the $15M it paid to its CEO, Vikram Pandit.

They … and by “they” I’m referring, not to Irving Glotz of Goleta, California, who owns 143 shares, but to the fund managers who have enough votes to care about, and who presumably have some sophistication in such matters … they expressed dismay that Pandit’s compensation was excessive given CitiGroup’s performance, and that it wasn’t properly structured so as to provide the right incentives.

To be fair, averaged over the last three years the poor guy had to subsist on a mere $5M per year. To be even more fair, we aren’t going to touch on whether, in a company where the average employee gets less than 0.0004% of the revenue, it makes sense for the CEO to get about 0.02% of it or not.

Nope. The question this week is about 2009 and 2010, the years in which Pandit was paid $1 and $129,000 respectively, and whether the shareholders’ complaint about proper incentives is legitimate.

The answer is, no, and the reason it’s no means we need to re-think the whole idea of incentive pay, from the very top of the company right on down to you, your management team, and anyone else in your organization who receives a pay-for-performance bonus.

Why the answer is no is this question: Why would any Board of Directors hire a CEO it has to bribe to do a good job? And yet, in the ranks of a company’s top executives, the need to bribe the top execs is simply assumed.

This isn’t a new insight. Alfie Kohn made the point almost 20 years ago in his groundbreaking book, Punished by Rewards, and Daniel Pink reinforced it in his excellent Drive, providing solid evidence that most people, most of the time, perform their best when money isn’t at stake, and when they have opportunities to achieve great things (his formula is “Autonomy, mastery, and purpose”).

Which leads to my radical, certain-to-be-completely-ignored proposal: Boards of Directors should get rid of executive incentive pay entirely. They should pay a very nice amount of money (the best executives do work more hours and under more stress than most of us, and companies do have to compete for the best of them), although just how nice isn’t something we’ll explore here.

The point is that how much these execs receive should not be tied to any specific performance metric or combination of metrics, and the Board should refuse to hire any top executives who insist on a package like this.

Instead, the Board should hire pinball players … executives who enjoy the game, want to play it, and are motivated by the possibility of winning a free game so they can play again next year.

All that’s left is for the Board to explain, in English (but probably not in terms of specific numeric targets) what success looks like. This conversation should be only minimally about such minor matters as profits and share price, as profits are a rear-view mirror view, and share price reflects the consensus of outsiders as to how persuasive the company is in explaining how great things are going to be.

What the conversation should be about are such topics as marketshare, customer retention and walletshare, new customer acquisition, product innovation, operational efficiency and so on.

It should be about what the Board considers the company’s strategic drivers to be. Once those are established, it’s up to the CEO to run the company in a way that achieves them.

Now it’s your turn. Ask yourself, are you a pinball player? If you could have a conversation about what IT’s strategic drivers are, and then just run things the way you think they should be run, without once asking yourself how any of it might affect your bonus, do you think the outcome would be better or worse than how you do things now?

My guess: Not just better, but more satisfying. Which leads to this suggestion: Approach whoever you report to, and offer this deal — that whatever your current incentive pay is, the company should add half of it to your base salary.

The rest? Suggest it go into the R&D budget. I’ll bet it could use the help.