When discussing the institution of strong business processes, we consultants have been known to use the term “hero” disparagingly.
It isn’t that we think poorly of the heroes themselves. Those who overcome significant obstacles to create important results deserve nothing but praise. What we’re denigrating is the need for heroics — of creating an environment that requires employees to overcome barriers that exist only because company management hasn’t been willing to invest in their removal. Or worse, that exist only because company management has placed them there.
Which brings us to some more lessons from hurricane Katrina and its aftermath (see “Katrina Lessons,” 9/12/2005).
In the midst of watching the president and Congress argue over which of their dueling analyses is better (but why, exactly, was creating two competing analyses a good use of taxpayer dollars?) comes a valuable reminder to all of us who recommend the institution of well-designed, continuously improving, Lean, Six-Sigma-compliant, Theory-of-Constraints-aware processes: Who you hire is more important than how you design the work.
The proof is simple and syllogistic. It’s often ignored, too — perhaps because processes, being designable, documentable, objectively measurable, and without egos, personalities and feelings, are easier to deal with than human beings. Here it is:
My major premise is that the wrong people can, and usually do mess up even the best processes.
My minor premise is that the right people can achieve excellent results, even when shackled with abominable processes.
My conclusion is that having the right people is more important than having the right processes.
Q. E. D.
Logical proof is nice. Evidence is more persuasive. Which brings us to the President’s report. As described in a Washington Post article by Stephen Barr ( “Acts of Heroism Shine Through Homeland Security’s Humiliation,” Friday, February 24, 2006; B02), acts of heroism achieved important results in spite of the general lack of preparation, processes and procedures that characterized the overall response to Katrina. For example:
Coast Guard Petty Officer Jessica Guidroz, who herself had lost everything she owned, led a squadron of eight boats and crews that evacuated about 2,000 people from the University of New Orleans.
Petty Officer Moises Rivera-Carrion, a Coast Guard rescue swimmer, was on duty for three solid days. He dodged downed power lines and contaminated floodwaters to rescue 269 survivors trapped on rooftops and balconies throughout the region.
Then there was Coast Guard Petty Officer Rodney L. Gordon. He was the first to fly into New Orleans, in the face of strong winds and wind-blown debris. Cannibalizing broken gear for parts, he personally rewired emergency generators to get the Naval Air Station control tower up and running. Had he failed to do so, hundreds of lifesaving missions would not have flown.
Three heroes among many. The important question is the extent to which heroics should have been required, not the heroism itself.
For Katrina I’ll leave the answer to the dueling investigating committees. For IT, and how managers should think about and plan such matters:
Professionals divide problems into two categories: Foreseen problems and foreseen unforeseen problems. Professionals plan for the unexpected.
Amateurs, in contrast, deal with foreseen problems and unforeseeable unforeseen problems. Figuring bad things only happen to other people, and on someone else’s watch, is the mark of an amateur.
Then there are those who conduct the post mortem. Too often, they see only foreseen problems and foreseeable unforeseen problems. They consider the latter — the ones planners should have anticipated but failed to — unforgivable. They’re especially so because it usually turns out they were foreseen — just not by the people responsible for planning, who chose to ignore those who recognized the risk in question.
But people aren’t perfect; there’s no clear line separating foreseeable and unforeseeable problems; some of those who warn of impending catastrophes are right by accident, not expertise; and forgiveness — the flip side of blame — has no point. What matters is following three inviolable rules of the professional planner: (1) Anticipate and plan for what you can; (2) expect the unexpected and provide for it; and (3) use post mortems to drive improvement, not to find fault.
In your contingency planning, remember this lesson from Katrina. It won’t help you pass a Sarbanes-Oxley or CobiT audit, but it will help you survive your next contretemps. It is:
Your last, best hope when the unexpected happens is to have hired and retained employees who have the ingenuity, maturity and courage to assess the situation in front of them and take whatever action is necessary.
Doing so isn’t an alternative to having the right processes and procedures. It’s merely more important.