If I were starting a business today, I wouldn’t dream of using Microsoft Office.

No, Corel hasn’t bribed me. This is simple economics. Corel has priced its office suite so much lower than Microsoft I can’t imagine enough of an incremental benefit to MS Office to cover the spread.

Very few of InfoWorld’s readers are opening a business today, but many of you have MS Office ’97 staring you in the face. There’s no concurrent use licensing, file formats aren’t backward compatible, and it costs a lot of money compared to its competition.

Besides, many of you have expressed strong interest in the NC, which means you’re open to non-Microsoft applications. If you’re going to make your move, now’s the time.

Last I heard, IS budgets were still pretty tight, so the savings should be pretty interesting to a frugal CIO. “Except,” I can hear some of you thinking (I have mentioned my telepathic abilities, haven’t I?) “software is just a small part of the total cost of PC ownership. So this will just be nibbling around the margins.”

The numbers you hear bandied about on this subject are ridiculous. If you really believe each PC costs you eleven grand a year, put out an RFP. Any number of outsourcers will be delighted to provision your desktops for at least 20% less than that (I’d make the offer myself, but I don’t like lines that long).

So here’s what I’m going to do. Over the next few months, as a bizarre hobby, I’m going to put a better model together. InfoWorld’s Features and Test Labs may join me … we’re still working out the details. The point of this model won’t be the “real” costs. The point will be to help you probe the issues you face managing this resource, so you can make realistic decisions.

Here are the key elements this kind of model needs:

Fixed and Variable Components: Any useful financial analysis separates costs into those that don’t vary with volume and those that do. Analysis often benefits from separating “semi-variable” costs – those that increase in large steps at certain volume increments) – from purely variable costs.

Partitioning of Benefit-driven Expenses and Overhead: Some expenses increase as employees take greater advantage of technology. Training is a good example: the higher your training costs, the more different applications employees know how to use, which means they’re gaining more value from their systems. On the other paw, you have to spend some money before the employee ever turns the system on. Include network connections in this category. Understanding the difference is critical.

Separation of Non-Technical Issues: I’m heartily bored with hearing how much time goes into managing hard disk space, doing backups, and all the related drivel. Take away the PC and employees will spend more time than that handling and filing paper, cleaning out filing cabinets when they get full, and wasting all the other time that gets used with non-technical alternatives. If we include these costs at all it will be as negative numbers, crediting the time saved from doing things the old ways.

Recognition of the Real World: PC cost models pretend we work rigid schedules at hourly rates. Time spent in non-value-adding activities like training is lost to the organization.

It’s a great theory that ignores our day-to-day experience. When most of us take a vacation, our coworkers absorb some of our work and the rest piles up until we get back. We deal with it when we return, and our vacation (or training class, or whatever) costs our employers effectively nothing.

Still believe each PC costs you $11K per year? Call me … I’m selling shares in a bridge crossing the East River, and I’m just sure you’ll want a piece of the action.

In 1988 I saved taxpayers million of dollars by talking my client, part of a government agency, out of its planned conversion to OS/2. Pundits were predicting OS/2’s success, but I saw no easy migration path from DOS, difficult integration into existing LANs, and no hurry. Besides, IBM’s decision to build OS/2 from scratch instead of creating “personal UNIX” struck me then, as now, as unnecessarily complicating its product line.

In 1990, a NeXT sales representative asked what it would take to bring some NeXT computers into our organization (I had rejoined the private sector by then). “It has to run a WordPerfect-compatible word processor, a Lotus-compatible spreadsheet, and log into our Novell servers,” I answered. It didn’t and I didn’t, seeing no easy migration path from DOS, difficult integration into existing LANs, and no hurry. Besides, I hated NeXT’s weird capitalization.

To invade an existing architecture, new technology must offer: (1) easy integration into existing environments; (2) a clear migration path; (3) a compelling advantage; and (4) attractive pricing.

And right now, as Bill Gates seems to dominate the known universe, invasion of the desktop OS is possible for the first time in years. Four disparate factors lead me to this conclusion.

Factor #1: Dissatisfaction with current PC operating systems. The market leaders are all awful. Windows/95 is a kludge, Windows/NT is flabby, OS/2 only runs on Intel and has no applications, and the Mac OS lacks memory protection and preemptive multitasking. And they’re all hard and expensive to manage.

Factor #2: Openness to other solutions. The Network Computer, while a bad idea, has created a crack in Microsoft’s mindshare, and mindshare – the perception that a company is now and will be an important player – is all that matters. If you have mindshare, marketshare will follow; if you don’t, marketshare is irrelevant. If you don’t believe me, just look at Novell’s slide into irrelevance.

Factor #3: Bill Gates’ imitation of Napoleon. The similarities are compelling: while physically unprepossessing, Napoleon was and Gates is a brilliant strategist and tactician. Napoleon fought a two-front war and lost his empire. Gates has instituted repressive laws “at home” (Microsoft’s ridiculous new desktop licensing terms, reported in several recent issues of InfoWorld) and has engaged its enemies (everyone else) on the network OS, Internet, and DBMS fronts. That’s a passle o’ wars to fight all at once.

Factor #4: Steve Jobs and NeXTStep at Apple. While Gil Amelio reportedly is a shrewd businessman, he’s not the visionary Apple needs to reclaim industry mindshare. Steve Jobs can grab industry mindshare while the Apple name can give NeXTStep instant industry credibility.

Put these factors together, and imagine Apple does everything right for a change. Imagine it ports NeXTStep to the PowerPC; makes the transition from the current Mac OS to MacNeXTStep as easy as it made the transition to the PowerPC a few years ago, building backward compatibility into MacNeXTStep so current Mac applications will run well; keeps the Mac’s legendary ease of set-up intact; makes it easy to port applications written for other UNIXes to MacNeXTStep; builds in manageability (easy to do with UNIX); and matches current Wintel price points. Oh, and demonstrates betas by mid-year and ships by 1998.

You’d have a new desktop architecture with everything going for it: price, integration, migration path, compelling advantages, and industry credibility.

How does this affect you today? You’re writing client/server applications right now, and you have to make decisions on the desktop platforms you’re writing them for. Every new application makes transition to a new architecture more expensive, no matter how attractive the technology may be on its own merits. So what should you do?

Watch closely, make short-term, pragmatic decisions, and invest in flexible, portable application architectures. The world is about to become even more interesting.